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I. INTRODUCTION
Governmental record keeping of individual data is as old as civi-
lization itself. The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and
the technological revolution since the mid-i 960s have made the record
keeping of such data much easier and more comprehensive.) In the
past two decades, computer science has advanced at an abnormally
high rate of speed. As the cost of computing power and storage ca-
pacity drops, businesses increasingly use computer technology for rec-
ord keeping, market analysis, and managerial decision making;
governmental agencies increasingly use computer technology for
keeping census data, for tracking program participants, and for intelli-
gence purposes. As a result, data about citizens are gathered and kept
in at least one commercial or governmental data base. Questions that
soon arise are: "Who keeps data about me? What is being stored?
Why? Who has access to my personal data? How will those data
harm me?" All of these questions raise one common concern, namely,
whether an individual's privacy with regard to an individual's data is
adequately protected.
Many European nations have passed data protection laws as part
of national privacy legislation to address this concern.2 Those data
protection laws address the right to have some control over the collec-
tion, storage, use, and dissemination of one's personal data." In order
to have consistent laws throughout Europe, the European Commission
will soon pass several directives. In the United States, however, virtu-
ally no such laws exist - putting private, personal information of
American citizens at risk of public disclosure and scrutiny.
This article first addresses the origins of data protection both
globally and in Europe, focusing on the most recent directives under
consideration by the European Commission. This article then briefly
summarizes the few existing data protection statutes in the United
States and concludes with recommendations as to how the United
States could remedy some of the shortcomings in this area of law.
II. HISTORY OF DATA PROTECTION IN EUROPE
The history of data protection is rooted in the efforts of European
nations, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, to curb the
1. See COLIN J. BENNE-r, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES 18-19 (1992).
2. Data protection is technically a type of privacy concern. Privacy includes an individ-
ual's right to be free from brazen police searches and from wiretapping; privacy also includes the
right to make private decisions within one's family. See id. at 13.
3. Id.
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threat of improper use of personal data. These nations' concerns are
also manifested in global and regional efforts. The two organizations
that have contributed early on to the harmonization of data protection
regulation are the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD)4 and the Council of Europe.5 Their efforts are con-
sidered the forefathers of the Amended Proposal for a Council
Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the
Processing of Personal Data,6 as currently under discussion by the Eu-
ropean Council.7
To show the history behind the individual provisions of the
Amended Proposal, this section summarizes the efforts of the OECD
and the Council of Europe. This section then provides a brief view of
how various European nations, especially the Federal Republic of
Germany,8 have dealt with national data protection issues.
A. World-wide Data Protection: the OECD Guidelines
Concurrent with the development of data protection laws in indi-
vidual countries and in the Council of Europe, the OECD studied the
need for uniform data protection laws.' In 1980, after two years of
investigation, 10 the OECD established broad, voluntary guidelines for
the protection of personal data." These guidelines significantly paral-
lel the recommendation of the European Convention.'2
4. The Organization for Economic Development, founded in 1960 by 20 nations includ-
ing the United States, aims "to promote economic and social welfare throughout the OECD area
by assisting member governments in the formulation and coordination of policies; to stimulate
and harmonize members' aid efforts in favor of developing nations; and to contribute to the
expansion of world trade." Robert C. Boehmer & Todd S. Palmer, The 1992 ECData Protection
Proposal: An Examination of Its Implications for U.S. Business and U.S. Privacy Lan, 31 AM.
Bus. L.J. 265, 271 n.33 (1993).
5. See infra part II.B. The Council of Europe is not the equivalent to the European
Union. The Council of Europe was founded in 1948 by several European nations in order to
further unities among its members and to promote civil liberties. Hillary E. Pearson, Data Pro-
tection in Europe, 8 CoMPUTER LAW. 24, 24 fn.1 (1991). See generally A.H. ROBERTSoN, Tn
CouNcm OF EUROPE (2nd ed. 1961).
6. European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 1992 OJ. (C 311) 4 [hereinafter Amended Proposal].
7. See Peter Mei, The EC Proposed Data Protection Law, 25 LAW & POL'Y INr'L Bus.
305, 305 (1993). See also infra part III.
8. See infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
9. Mei, supra note 7, at 306.
10. Id.
11. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Council Recommendation
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
12. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Eur. TS. No. 108 [hereinafter European Con-
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The OECD established as limitations on the collection of per-
sonal data that such data should be collected lawfully with the knowl-
edge and consent of the data subject. 3 Data that are collected are to
be of certain quality in that they should be accurate, complete, and up
to date.' 4 The purpose of the data collection effort should be speci-
fied.' 5 However, the guidelines are unclear as to whom this disclosure
should be made. Once such a specification has been made, the col-
lected data may not be used for a different purpose without the data
subject's consent or authority of law. 6 The data gatherer has the bur-
den of protecting stored data from unauthorized access, destruction,
use, modification, or dissemination. 17 While the OECD Guidelines
represent a first effort to harmonize protection of personal data on a
global basis, these principles are written in a very broad manner.
The OECD Guidelines provide that a data subject has the right to
inquire what types of data an entity has gathered about the individ-
ual. 8 The entity must provide the individual with such information
within a reasonable time of the inquiry at a reasonable charge and in a
form that is intelligible to the individual.' 9 If such information is in-
correct, the individual has the right to have such incorrect data erased
or corrected.2 °
The OECD Guidelines also provide that the free flow of informa-
tion across national borders should not be restricted unless the recipi-
ent nation "does not yet substantially observe these Guidelines or
where the re-export of such data would circumvent its domestic pri-
vacy legislation."' The OECD guidelines thus expressed an
equivalency standard, which means the recipient nation of a transna-
tional data flow must have data protection laws that protect personal
privacy to the same extent as the nations from which it receives data.
In addition to the OECD, the Council of Europe generated certain
data protection guidelines that helped influence the Amended Propo-
sal. The Council's standards are discussed next.
vention]; Klaus Bhloff and Axel Baumanns, Harmonising German Data Protection and the
Council of Europe Convention, INT'L Bus. LAW. 175 (April 1984).
13. OECD Guidelines, supra note 11, Annex, 7. The OECD Guidelines define the data
subject as a person about whom data exist. Id. 1 (b).
14. Id. 8.
15. Id. 9.
16. Id. 10.
17. Id. 11.
18. Id. % 13(a), (b).
19. Id. 13(b).
20. Id. 13(d).
21. Id. 17.
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B. Early European Data Protection Efforts: the European
Convention
The European initiative for rules of law relating to data protec-
tion originated through the collective efforts of individual European
nations. In 1968 the Council of Europe began "to study potential
courses for data protection legislation."'  The European Convention
stressed the free flow of data and secondarily addressed protection of
individuals.2 3 After an extensive period of study simultaneous to that
of the OECD, the Council of Europe passed a resolution concerning
stored personal data in 1974.24 Accordingly, the resolution states: a)
information about an individual's private life should not be dissemi-
nated, b) data gatherers should only store relevant information, c)
rules should be implemented regarding collection, storage, and dis-
semination of data, d) individuals should have the right to know what
data are stored where and for what reason, e) individuals should have
the right to have incorrect information corrected or deleted, and f)
only those entities or individuals with a valid purpose should have
access to personal data.2 1 These preliminary guidelines became the
basis for the first binding Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1981.26 The
European Convention covers both the private and public sectors27 and
establishes quality standards28 which gatherers of personal data must
follow in order to protect all individuals with regard to processed
data.29
The European Convention specifies that data must be: a) obtained
and processed fairly and legitimately, b) stored and used for legal pur-
poses, c) adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the pur-
pose for which they are stored, d) accurate and up to date, and e)
maintained only as long as required to achieve their purpose.30 The
European Convention prohibits outright the gathering of information
relating to race, political opinion, religious and other beliefs, health,
22. Mei, supra note 7, at 307.
23. B6hloff and Baumanns, supra note 12, at 176. Note the difference in approach taken
by the Council of Europe as compared to, for instance, the German legislature. The Germans
emphasized much more protection of individuals' privacy. See infra notes 44-54.
24. Patrick E. Cole, New Challenges to the U.S. Multinational Corporation in the Euro-
pean Economic Community: Data Protection Laws, 17 N.Y.U. J. Iirr'rL L. & POL. 893, 898 n.30
(1985).
25. Id. at 898.
26. European Convention, supra note 12.
27. Id. art. 3(l).
28. Id. art. 5.
29. Id. art. 1.
30. Id. art. 5.
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sexual habits, and criminal convictions unless domestic law provides
appropriate safeguards against unauthorized use."'
In addition to standards relating to data quality, the European
Convention provides individuals with additional rights, following the
model of the German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 1977.32 Individuals
may: a) inquire to any data gathering entity as to the existence of a
personal data file, b) obtain a copy of the data kept in reasonably legi-
ble form, c) obtain correction or erasure of false or otherwise improp-
erly kept data, and d) request that personal data be erased if the data
gatherer does not provide the individual access to or a copy of his
data.33 In addition, no state may make exceptions to the quality of
data standards and the individual rights created under the European
Convention with the exception of issues relating to national security
and public safety.34
Since the European Convention did not include definitions and
was not self-executing, individual countries, in their implementing
legislation, have provided their own.35 This deficiency and the inher-
ent differences between each country's implementing legislation have
contributed to a lack of harmony between the European nations' laws.
This lack of harmony, in turn, has resulted in provisions restricting
flow of data across national boundaries if the recipient country did not
have adequate data protection guidelines in the mind of the sender's
country.3 6 This phenomenon was consistent with the European Con-
vention's language with regard to transnational data flows.3 7 The only
other circumstance under which the European Convention permitted
regulation of transborder data flows remained in the case of transfer
through an intermediary party with the purpose of circumventing data
protection guidelines.38
C. Precursor to the European Draft Directive: National
Efforts
European nations recognized early on that, while the computer
was a superb tool for the promotion of progress in Europe, the use of
computers presented a potential threat to individual privacy.39 In or-
31. Id. art. 6.
32. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
33. European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 8.
34. Id. art 9.
35. Mei, supra note 7, at 308.
36. Id.
37. European Convention, supra note 12, art. 12(2) and (3)(a).
38. Id. art. 12(3)(b).
39. Cole, supra note 24, at 901-08.
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der to minimize this threat from the outset, Sweden and the Federal
Republic of Germany were first to establish data protection guidelines
beginning in the 1970s.
Sweden passed the first national data protection law in 1973.40
The Swedish Data Bank Statute principally prohibited the gathering of
data about persons without governmental authorization.4' Most im-
portantly, the law established a national Data Inspection Board
charged with enforcement of the statute.42 The Data Inspection Board
further controls the licensing process over .data gathering; the Data
Inspection Board may further gain access to data bases to ensure that
the entity storing personal data is in compliance with the Data Bank
Statute.43
As do the Swedes, Germans value privacy. The German tradition
of privacy began in the German Civil Code of 1896 in a provision
protecting the credit of individuals that requires "a person making an
incorrect statement, which was capable of endangering the credit of
another, although [he knows] that such statement is incorrect, is obli-
gated to compensate the other for any damages resulting therefrom."'
After World War II, the right to privacy was imbedded in the German
constitution,4' and as a result, Germany has a "scheme of integrated
privacy and data protection laws at the federal and state levels."46
In initial cases relating to privacy as applied to the maintenance
of data, the German Federal Constitutional Court objected to the gov-
ernment's keeping an inventory of private data of individuals by
means of confidential government census.47
The German state of Hesse passed the first Data Protection Law
in 1970, "but it applied only to the public sector, and was merely a
state, not a federal, law."48 The German federal government followed
the Hessen model when it passed the Law on the Protection of Per-
sonal Data Against Misuse in Data Processing.4 9
40. Id. at 902-03.
41. Id. at 902.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 902-03.
44. B6hloff and Baumanns, supra note 12, at 175.
45. Grundgesetz [GG] (Constitution, Federal Republic of Germany) art. I.
46. David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protec-
tion, 41 CASs W. REs. L. R. 831, 841 (1991).
47. B6hlhoff and Baumanns, supra note 12, at 175 (citing Federal Constitutional Court,
Dec. of July 16, 1969, BVerfGE 27, 1(6)).
48. Cole, supra note 24, at 903.
49. Gesetz zum Schutz vor Missbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenver-
arbeitung, 1977 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I. § 201 (Federal Republic of Germany) [hereinafter
German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 1977].
1996]
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The German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 1977 applied to both
the public and the private sectors and covered manual as well as auto-
mated processing of personal data of natural, not legal, persons.50 The
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz was, thereby, a front runner of the European
Convention to which the Federal Republic was a signatory.51 The
provisions of the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz are essentially similar to
those of the European Convention and the OECD Guidelines, except
for various additional provisions.
The German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz includes the establishment
of supervisory bodies.52 On the public level, the law requires the es-
tablishment of a state supervisory authority charged with the responsi-
bility of assuring compliance; private entities employing five or more
persons for data administration purposes have to appoint a "data pro-
tection representative" who is charged with the same responsibility as
the public state agency. 3 Since this administrator still reports to man-
agement, his only true remedy is to report alleged violations to the
state authority.5 4
While the OECD Guidelines require that the recipient nation's
data protection standards must afford equivalent protection as under
OECD Guidelines, German law is silent as to whether transborder data
flows are permissible. 5 It appears, therefore, that they are permissible
under most circumstances. This issue of transborder data flows be-
came important during the negotiations of the Treaty of Unification
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Demo-
cratic Republic56 due to the vast amounts of data collected by the East
German state police on the activities and beliefs of individuals. The
treaty reiterated that data may only be transmitted for legitimate pur-
poses, and the recipient may not distribute these data for purposes
other than those specified by the transmitter.57 The treaty defers to the
European Convention for the parties' conduct with respect to data
protection. 58
50. Cole, supra note 24, at 904.
51. See supra part II.B.
52. B6hloff and Baumanns, supra note 12, at 177.
53. Id.
54. Id. See also BairNmr, supra note 1, at 74-82 (providing an excellent summary of the
German data protection laws).
55. B6hloff and Baumanns, supra note 12, at 179.
56. Federal Republic of Germany - German Democratic Republic: Treaty Establishing a
Monetary, Economic and Social Union, 29 I.L.M. 1108 (1990).
57. Id. Annex VII I1 1-4.
58. Id. Annex VII 7.
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I. THE EUROPEAN DRAFT DIRECTIVES ON DATA PROTECTION
Since the data protection guidelines of both the OECD Guide-
lines and the European Convention are of rather general nature, differ-
ent standards of data protection among European Union members
have developed.59 In response, the European Commission in 1990 is-
sued three proposals serving to protect personal data rights. The first
deals with individuals' rights regarding processing of personal data;60
the second addresses the protection of personal data with respect to
electronic data networks;61 the third specifically confronts information
security.62 The Economic and Social Committee commented on all
three proposals simultaneously in April 1991,63 reemphasizing that in-
dividual privacy must be strictly protected.6' Considering the pro-
posed changes, the European Commission issued an amended
proposal of individuals' rights regarding processing of personal data in
1992.65 The Amended Proposal did not pass as expected in late 1993
or by the implementation deadline of July 1, 1994;66 instead, the Euro-
pean Commission issued an amended proposal for the protection of
personal data with respect to electronic data networks in June of
1994,67 designed to supplement the general directive.68 This section
59. Pearson, supra note 5.
60. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of
Individuals in Relation to the Piocessing of Personal Data, 1990 O.J. (C 277) 3 [hereinafter 1990
Proposal]. For an excellent background of the 1990 Proposal, see Olga Estadella-Yuste, The
Draft Directive of the European Community Regarding the Protection of Personal Data, 41
INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 170 (1992).
61. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of
Personal Data and Privacy in the Context of Public Digital Telecommunications Networks, in
Particular the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and Public Digital Mobile Networks,
1990 O.J. (C 277) 4.
62. Proposal for a Council Decision in the Field of Information Security, 1990 O.J. (C
277) 5.
63. European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on: The Proposal for a Council
Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the Processing of Personal
Data; the Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Personal Data and Pri-
vacy in the Context of Public Digital Telecommunications Networks, in Particular the Integrated
Services Digital Network (ISDN) and Public Digital Mobile Networks; the Proposal for a Coun-
cil Decision in the Field of Information Security, 1991 O.J. (C 159) 14 [hereinafter Economic
and Social Committee Opinion].
64. Id. art. L.1.
65. Amended Proposal, supra note 6.
66. Id. art. 35(1). This delay is partially due to the European Parliament's desire for addi-
tional definitions and clarification of the scope of the proposed directive. Comintssion of the
European Communities, Protection of Personal Data: Public Digital Telecommunications Net-
works, Sept. 12, 1994, at 4.5.11, 4, available in Lexis, EUROCOM Library, Info-92 File.
67. Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Concerning the
Protection of Personal Data and Privacy in the Context of Digital Telecommunications Net-
works, in Particular the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and Digital Mobile Net-
works, 1994 OJ. (C 200) 5 [hereinafter Network Draft]. Note that the word "public" has been
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summarizes both amended proposals in turn, discussing the strengths
and weaknesses of several provisions.
A. The 1992 Amended Proposal on Data Protection
1. Objectives and General Provisions
The Amended Draft, after no less than thirty-four recitals, care-
fully reiterates in the statement of its objectives the competing inter-
ests of data privacy and free flow of personal data between European
states;6 9 the statement of objectives thereby introduced a conflict
which is apparent throughout the Amended Proposal and which re-
quired careful balancing on behalf of the Commission.
The Commission determined that the directive should apply to all
personal data,70 whether processed manually or automatically,71 ex-
cluding only the processing of data outside the reach of EC law and
processing of personal data by a natural person when done for private
purposes.72 In addition, the Amended Proposal allows member states
to implement rules that address how the protection of personal privacy
is to balance with the freedom of the press.73 These scope limitations
are significant because they allow the Amended Proposal to address
the evil against which remedy is sought: the commercial and govern-
mental use of private data. The fact that the European Commission
stricken to emphasize that, in a change in approach, the directive would apply to private as well
as public networks. Id.
68. Network Draft, supra note 67.
69. Amended Proposal, supra note 6, art.l.
70. "Personal data" is defined as:
[A]ny information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data
subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indi-
rectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural, or so-
cial identity ....
Amended Proposal, supra note 6, art. 2(a). Note that this directive only applies to natural,
not legal, persons. Entities such as corporations do not enjoy protection under this proposed
directive. European Commission, National Implementing Measures; Data Protection; What Can
Be Done To Protect Personal Data?, September 8, 1994, available in LEXIS.
71. "Processing" of personal data is defined as:
[A]ny operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization,
storage, adaption or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmis-
sion, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination,
blocking, erasure or destruction.
Amended Proposal, supra note 6, art. 2 (b). This provision remains subject to debate as several
nations oppose the reach of this directive to include manual processing of data. See European
Social Policy, No Agreement in Council on Personal Data Protection, Europe Information Ser-
vice, July 15, 1994, available in LEXIS.
72. Amended Proposal, supra note 6, art. 3.
73. Id. art. 9.
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requires businesses as well as governments to ensure that a person's
privacy is not infringed presents one crucial difference between the
Amended Proposal and past Congressional efforts, as shall be seen
below.
The European Commission charged the individual controller74 of
data with the proper implementation7" and enforcement 76 of the laws
each European state would prescribe following the Amended Propo-
sal's provisions. This controller is responsible to a supervisory gov-
ernmental authority charged with the duty of assuring that the
country's provisions comply with those of the Amended Proposal.7 7
These provisions create a very clear structure. This structure allows
governmental agencies to cooperate with businesses to ascertain com-
pliance, and it provides the European citizen with a clear picture of to
whom to address violations or abuses of an individual's rights.
The supervisory body may hear complaints initiated by data sub-
jects.71 Furthermore, the supervisory body has investigative and inter-
vening powers to assure that the processor complies with national
laws and the directive; it also is charged with prosecuting violators.79
The nations' supervisory bodies are also asked to cooperate in order to
assure effective enforcement of the directive.Y0 Multinational corpora-
tions, which loathe these provisions because they increase operating
costs, should appreciate the efforts of the European Commission to
make these, and the corresponding national standards, as uniform as
possible. Likewise, the unsuspecting traveller, whether for business or
pleasure, is not confronted with inconsistent levels of protection of his
personal privacy.
The data controller, in turn, must ascertain that the data are stored
in a secured manner, paying due diligence to state of the art technol-
74. A "controller of data" is defined as
[A]ny natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body who
processes personal data. . . and who decides waht [sic] is the purpose and objec-
tive of the processing, which personal data are to be processed, which operations
are to be performed upon them and which third parties are to have access to them.
Id. art. 2(d).
A "third party" is "any natural or legal person other than the data subject ....
Id. art. 2(f).
75. Id. art. 4.
76. Id. art. 4(2).
77. Id. art. 30(1).
78. Id. art. 30(2).
79. Id. art. 30(2).
80. Id. art. 30(5). The supervisory bodies also elect members to a "working party." This
working party is placed under immediate authority of the Commission and is charged with assur-
ing uniformity of application and enforcement of the directive. See id. arts. 31, art. 32.
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ogy;8' this applies also to all types of data transfers, including network
communications and transmissions over telephone lines82 and to data
that are processed by an authorized agent of the controller.8" The con-
troller must also notify the national supervisory authority and provide
very specific information before processing personal data if the con-
troller seeks to gather new types of information or seeks to use pres-
ently stored information for a different purpose.84
The function of the data controller is double-edged. On the one
hand, the employee of a business charged with this duty must answer
to his superiors in his day to day activities; on the other hand, he must
assure that the company for which he works both complies with the
standards set forth by the Amended Proposal and addresses protection
issues raised by individuals. These duties are inherently conflicting.
In order to at least partially remedy this conflict, the business should
treat this controller as an internal auditor; just as internal auditors re-
port to the Board Audit Committee, the controller of data should re-
port directly to a special committee of the board of directors or of the
advisory board.
2. Data Quality
The Amended Proposal sets specific principles relating to data
quality, heavily drawing on the quality standards introduced by the
European Convention and the OECD Guidelines. While data must be
collected for "specified, explicit, and legitimate" s purposes and
processed "lawfully and fairly,"8 6 these data must not be excessive or
unrelated to the purpose for which they are kept.8 7 Data must also be
kept current; old and irrelevant data must be removed. 8 The basic
data quality provisions alone place a substantial burden on the proces-
sor of data. 9 Such rules would, for instance, prevent false or old in-
formation to remain present on credit reports; the burden remains on
the processor of data, not the data subject, to ascertain that the data are
and remain correct. This provision raises the cost of doing business,
81. The function of the controller is similar under the German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of
1977. German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 1977, supra note 49.
82. Amended Proposal, supra note 6, art. 17.
83. Id. art. 24(1) and (2).
84. See id. art. 18(l)-(3).
85. Id. art. 6(1)(b).
86. Id. art. 6(1)(a).
87. Id. art. 6(1)(c).
88. Id. art. 6(1)(d).
89. The processor of data is defined as "any natural or legal person who processes per-
sonal data on behalf of the controller." Id. art. 2(e).
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thereby encouraging processing firms to store only minimal amounts
of data to keep liability exposure to a minimum.
3. Conditions on the Processing of Personal Data
Next, the Amended Proposal sets specific conditions under which
personal data may be processed. Processing is always allowed with
the data subject's consent." If such consent is not given, data may
generally be collected if necessary for a legitimate interest, unless that
interest is outweighed by the interests of the data subject.9' This last
provision is more restrictive than it appears, because this directive
presumes that the individual's right to privacy is paramount.
In addition, these two conflicting interests are not balanced if cer-
tain types of data are to be processed. These, again paralleling the
European Convention, include data "revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious beliefs, philosophical or ethical persua-
sion, or trade union membership, and of data concerning health or
sexual life.""2 The data subject must have given written permission
for the processing of these data.93 Religious, political, and similar or-
ganizations may, of course, continue to keep a member data base, pro-
vided that such data are not disclosed to third parties.94 In addition,
data concerning criminal convictions may only be kept by "judicial
and law-enforcement authorities. ' 95 The Commission singled out
these types of data because they represent the very core of an individ-
ual's Privatsphdre; most Europeans deeply believe that these special
pieces of information are simply no one's business. This is in direct
contrast with U.S. citizens who as yet have complained little about
their nonexisting rights of data privacy for a variety of cultural reasons
that this author has not had the opportunity to explore in depth.
4. The "Data Subject's Bill of Rights"
Following the German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, the European
Commission has granted specific rights to the data subject. First, any
person (both natural and legal) has the right to receive detailed infor-
90. Id. art. 7(a). The Amended Proposal defines consent as any express and informed
indication of the data subject, provided that the consent was not coerced. The data subject is
entitled to the name of the controller of his data, and he may withdraw consent at any time. Id.
art. 2(g).
91. Id. art. 7(f).
92. Id. art. 8(1).
93. Id. art. 8(2)(a).
94. Id. art. 8(2)(b).
95. Id. art. 8(4).
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mation about a processor of data.96 Second, the controller of data
must provide the data subject with certain information about the data
being sought.97 Third, if the data at issue have been lawfully obtained
without consent of the data subject, the individual has the right to
know to which third parties his data are disclosed,98 unless otherwise
provided by the Amended Proposal or by a member state's law. 99
Fourth, the data subject has the right to access personal data (and their
use) kept by a processor or controller of data; such data must be pro-
vided in a useable form to the data subject.' 00 Fifth, the data subject
has the right to rectify inaccurate or incomplete data. 10 1 Sixth, the
data subject may compel the controller of data to block or erase data
that have been illegally obtained.102 Seventh, the processor or control-
ler must cease processing of an individual's data if the data subject
objects to the processing on legitimate grounds.'03 Eighth, the
Amended Proposal provides a private right of action to the data sub-
ject for any damages caused by the violation of the directive,' 04 im-
posing liability on anyone who unlawfully processes personal data.10 5
The controller may raise as an affirmative defense unauthorized access
if "he proves that he has taken suitable steps to satisfy the [provisions
regarding data security]."' 1 6 The Amended Proposal leaves imposi-
tion of criminal and civil penalties to the individual member states. 10 7
The "Data Subjects' Bill of Rights" places a large burden on the
processor and the controller of data. It empowers individuals to pro-
tect themselves against physical and electronic invasions of their
Privatsphdre. If no such rights exist, these individuals must bear all
damages related to the invasion of their personal privacy. However,
96. Such information includes "the existence of a processing operation, its purpose, the
categories of data concerned, any third parties... to whom the data are to be disclosed, and the
name and address of the controller. ... Id. art. 10(1).
97. Id. art. I 1(1). This includes the purpose for the processing of data, whether the reply to
any questions posed by the processor is voluntary or mandatory and any consequences for non-
compliance, the data user, any existing rights to access to the data collected, and the name and
address of the data controller. Public authorities are exempted from this requirement. Id. art.
11(2).
98. Id. art. 12(1).
99. Id. art. 12(2).
100. Id. art. 13(1). Any member state may restrict this right to protect paramount interests,
such as national security, criminal proceedings, public safety, and others. Id. art. 14(1).
101. Id. art. 13(3).
102. Id. Once such erasure or blocking has occurred, the data subject must be notified. Id.
art. 13(4).
103. Id. art. 15.
104. Id. art. 22.
105. Id. art. 23(1).
106. Id. art. 23(2).
107. Id. art. 24.
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besides having an incentive to comply, the processors and controllers
of data are collectively able to spread the cost of compliance among
their customers; this is a luxury not available to the individual.
5. Transborder Data Flows
Both the OECD Guidelines and the European Convention used
the test of "equivalent data protection laws" when determining
whether personal data should be sent across national borders; 1°8 under
these guidelines, however, the exact standard of equivalency was
never determined. While both the 1990 Proposal and the Amended
Proposal of 1992 provide that each member state must assure that per-
sonal data are transmitted to a third nation for the purpose of process-
ing only if that receiving nation "ensures an adequate level of
protection,"'1 9 neither proposal includes a definition of equivalency.
After much debate before the European Parliament, and on the
recommendation of the Economic and Social Committee, 11 this fairly
high standard was relaxed in the Amended Proposal, which made
transfers possible under certain conditions, even if the recipient nation
did not possess such an adequate level of protection."' Under the
Amended Proposal, the member nations themselves are charged with
reporting third nations that do not have adequate levels of protection
to the Commission, 1 2 so that the Commission may negotiate remedial
measures with the offending nation. 13
The standards for transborder data flows-to third nations are still
very high, having long raised concerns among many businesses and
commentators." 4 However, a lack of strict standards would render
the directives useless, since businesses could simply "export" personal
data to non-European nations and process these data outside the reach
of European data protection directives and national data protection
laws.
108. Most nations have developed the practice of following the equivalency standard. See
Pearson, supra note 5.
109. Amended Proposal, supra note 6, art. 26(1).
110. See Economic and Social Committee Opinion, supra note 63, 2.2.19.
111. Amended Proposal, supra note 6, art. 26(1). The Amended Proposal makes such a
transfer possible if the data subject consents, if a contract to do so exists between the data subject
and the controller, if the transfer is necessary to further an important public interest, or if "the
transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject." Id. art. 26(1).
These provisions eliminate some of the vagueness about which critics of the 1990 proposal
complained. See Estadella-Yuste, supra note 60, at 175-77.
112. Amended Proposal, supra note 6, art. 26(3).
113. Id. art. 26(4).
114. See, e.g., David P. Farnsworth, Data Privacy or Data Protection and Transborder or
Transnational Data Flow, an American's View of European Legislation, 11 INT'L Bus. LAW.
114 (1983).
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B. The 1994 Network Draft
The European Commission intended the Original Network Draft
of 1990 to operate independently of the other two proposals; the Com-
mission changed its approach for the Network Draft of 1994 to supple-
ment the Amended Proposal of 1992 in the area of
telecommunications.' Is Some of the Network Draft's provisions over-
lap with those of the Amended Proposal and are not discussed here.
Specifically, the Network Draft addresses telecommunications
organizations," 6 public telecommunications services, 1 7 and the pro-
vider of such services." 8 All data must be kept confidential, notwith-
standing distribution with the subscriber's consent; 1 9 the service
provider may not make "the provision of its service dependent upon
such consent."' 20 The Commission was especially concerned that data
incidental to the use of such services be stored and used only for bill-
ing purposes; 12 1 the service provider must destroy such data as soon as
they become outdated for that purpose.' 22 Today's technology allows
network providers, such as America Online, to easily monitor an indi-
vidual's account and keystroke activity. For instance, by monitoring
certain meeting rooms, such providers can easily assess a person's
115. Network Draft, supra note 67. For the nature of this streamlining effort, see id. at 7-
11.
116. The Network Draft defines "telecommunications organizations" as:
[A] public or private body, to which a Member State grants special or exclusive
rights for the provision of a public telecommunications network and, where appli-
cable, public telecommunications services.
Id. art. 2(l)
117. A "public telecommunications service" is a "telecommunications service whose supply
Members States have specifically entrusted inter alia to one or more telecommunications organi-
zations." Network Draft, supra note 67, art. 2(6). A "public telecommunications network," on
the other hand, is a "public telecommunications infrastructure which permits the conveyance of
signals between defined network termination points by wire, by microwave, by optical means or
by other electromagnetic means." Id. art. 2(5).
118. Id. art. 3. The Network Draft defines such a service provider as "a natural or legal
person providing services whose provision consists wholly or partly in the transmission and
routing of signals on a public telecommunications network, with the exception of radio broad-
casting and television." Id. art. 2(2). The latter exception is a bit troublesome given the recent
diminution of differences between, for instance, cable television and electronic information serv-
ices. In Europe, videotext/teletext has already made that line very indistinguishable.
119. Id. art. 7(l) and (2). A subscriber is defined as "any natural or legal person having
subscribed to a telecommunications service of a telecommunications organization or another
service provider." Id. art. 2(3).
120. Id. art. 7(3).
121. Id. art. 5. See also id. art. 6 (addressing electronic "traffic" data incidental to the
provision of services to the subscriber). These provisions apply especially for itemized bills. Id.
art. 7. (In Europe, unlike in the United States, itemized billing, for instance, for telephone calls,
is still relatively rare as many consider such a service extravagant.)
122. Id. art. 7.
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political, sexual, and other preferences. Such technology makes pro-
tective regulations such as the ones proposed in this article a necessity.
In respect of protective regulations, the Network Draft specifi-
cally addresses telephone services, often restricting the use of day to
day services that Americans have long taken for granted. For in-
stance, telephone calls may only be forwarded to a third party if that
party agrees;' 23 telephone directories may only list identifying infor-
mation that is absolutely necessary to identify the subscriber. 24 In
addition, telephone subscribers must be given the option to block
caller identification.1 2 Telephone subscribers have the right not to
receive solicitations if they so desire;' 26 this applies also to pre-
recorded voice 2 7 as well as fax solicitations. 12 Furthermore, member
states must assure that telephone tapping devices are kept out of public
hands and are applied by authorized governmental agencies only,
"subject to authorization by the competent judiciary or administrative
national authorities in conformity with national legislation."' 129 Once
conversations are recorded, the contents must remain confidential and
may not be relayed to unauthorized third parties.' 3° For that reason,
the Commission compels service providers to provide their subscrib-
ers with encryption facilities upon request for mobile phones to pre-
vent interception via airwaves.' 3
1
Again, individuals are given private rights of action to recover
any damages suffered from violation of the Network Draft.' 32 In addi-
tion, the working party as established under the Amended Proposal
will oversee proper implementation of the Network Draft.
Overall, the Amended Proposal and the Network Draft provide a
very competent set of rules in favor of personal data protection. These
rules are very general and will require some time for implementation,
but this burden is reduced by the fact that most European nations al-
ready have strong data protection laws; those nations will merely have
to streamline their regulations to comply with the European direc-
123. Id. art. 10.
124. Id. art. 11.
125. Id. art. 8.
126. Id. art. 13(l).
127. Id. art. 13(2).
128. Id. art. 13(3).
129. Id. art. 12(l).
130. Id. art. 12(2).
131. Id. art. 4. The number of impositions of"technical" solutions, such as this one, has
been reduced from the Original Network Draft. See Spicers Centre for Europe, Amended Draft
Directive on Personal Data Protection, June 13, 1994, available in LEXIS.
132. Network Draft, supra note 67, art. 16.
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tives. 133 These directives will certainly reduce the anxiety felt by
many Europeans about the "publication" of their private lives.
IV. DATA PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Unlike under the European Commission, no comprehensive regu-
lations favoring an individual's right to privacy exist in the United
States. The American law has been very slow to respond to the chal-
lenges of data protection presented by the information age.134 This is
quite an interesting phenomenon, since in 1890 two Americans, War-
ren and Brandeis, first identified privacy as the right to be left alone
from the intrusions of the state and other individuals. 135 This section
discusses briefly the historical development of data protection in the
United States, followed by a brief summary of shortcomings.
A. The United States Constitution and the Supreme Court
Authorities agree, so it appears, that there are at least two types
of privacy that are rooted in the Constitution. The First Amendment
recognizes a person's right to privacy in cases when one person's
speech collides with another's freedom of thought and solitude.136
The Fourth Amendment establishes that an individual is free from
government searches and seizures.' 37  The Constitution addresses
some privacy issues, but does not explicitly recognize a right to pri-
vacy, let alone data privacy. However, the European proposed direc-
tives on data protection take a comprehensive approach to protecting
the individual.1 38
Privacy principles have been introduced in many Supreme Court
cases. 139 In Roe v. Wade, these principles were based on the Four-
133. Germans, however, fear that the European data protection standards are too soft. See,
e.g., Markus Moninger, Unbegrinndete Angst vor dem mndigen Burger (Unsupported Fear of
the Informed Citizen), SODDaMrscl-m ZErruNG, Sept. 29, 1992, at 15.
134. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, The Communication Revolution and the Free Flow of Infor-
mation in a Transnational Setting, 30 AM. J. Com. L. 411, 411-12 (1982).
135. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193, 205 (1890). For a discussion of the development of the right of privacy in the United
States, see Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAA. L. REv. 1133 (1992).
136. Ken Gromley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1340.
137. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. See also Gromley, supra note 136, at 1340.
138. Robert G. Boehmer & Todd S. Palmer, The 1992 EC Data Protection Proposal: An
Examination of its Implications for U.S. Business and U.S. Privacy Law, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 265,
280 (1993).
139. The most commonly cited case in modem opinions is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). For a good history ofjudicial recognition of the right to privacy, see Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Autonomy, Community, and Traditions ofLiberty: The Contrast of British and
American Privacy Law, 1990 Durra L.J. 1398.
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teenth Amendment. 4 The Court, however, has been hesitant to ex-
tend the constitutional rights of privacy to the area of data protection.
For instance, in Paul v. Davis, the Court held that the right to nondis-
closure of personal information is not a fundamental right as is the
privacy right to procreation,' 4 ' unless this disclosure affects a funda-
mental right. 142 However, in Whalen v. Roe, the court recognized in
dicta that the there may exist a right to protect against improper dis-
closure of personal data.' 43 However, the Court in that case held that
the law in question did not violate the complainant's privacy rights. 1"
These few decisions notwithstanding, the Court acted on the un-
derstandable desire to leave tort legislation to Congress or to the com-
mon law of the states. Acts of Congress and common law are
discussed next.
B. Acts of Congress
Congress has taken "a sectoral, device specific, and activity or
damage specific" approach to data protection;1 45 this approach may be
popular with Congressional lobbyists with deep pocket clients, but it
does not further the individual's cause of informational privacy.
The first statutory protection of data dissemination was ratified in
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 [FCRA].'14  The FCRA pro-
vides specific rights for individuals and places responsibilities on
credit reporting agencies with-respect to an individual's credit worthi-
ness.' 4 7 The data reported must be accurate and up to date, 148 and the
individual has the right to correction,' 49 thereby somewhat preceding
the European Convention.' 5 However, the FCRA only deals with
data dissemination, not with data collection or storage.'' While
credit bureaus must assure that the captured data are accurate, they are
not held strictly liable for errors;' 52 in reality, the burden remains on
the individual to show that the data are incorrect. 53
140. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141. 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
142. Id. at 713-14.
143. 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
144. Id. at 605-06.
145. Boehmer and Palmer, supra note 138, at 303.
146. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1988).
147. Id. § 1681(b).
148. Id. §§ 1681e(b), 1681k(2).
149. Id. § 1681i.
150. See supra part II.B.
151. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. Comm. L.J. 195, 210-11 (1992).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e.
153. Id. § 1681.
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The Privacy Act of 1974154 represents Congress' first compre-
hensive approach to the protection of individuals' data as collected,
stored, and disseminated in the public sector. Notwithstanding twelve
exceptions, 155 the federal government may not disclose personal data
without consent of the data subject.56 An individual may have false
information corrected and has the right to access his file.' 57 Perhaps
most important, the Privacy Act of 1974 requires the government to
exercise due care in the compilation of personal data and to have con-
trols that secure databases from unauthorized access.' 58 However, the
Privacy Act of 1974 applies only to governmental data bases. 159 Pri-
vate data gatherers are not covered by this Act. In addition, while the
Act covers data dissemination, it does not address improper gathering
of data, nor does it address data quality issues.
To supplement the Privacy Act of 1974, the legislature passed
several additional laws, such as the Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974,160
which provided individuals with the right of error correction in false
credit card statements.' 6' The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of
1974162 prohibits the consideration of sex, race, color, religion, na-
tional origin, age, or marital status when granting credit and requires
credit institutions to provide the credit seeker with specific reasons for
denial.' 63 However, both statutes place the burden of proving errors
on the individual; until called to the attention of the controller of data,
no duty exists to gather correct information and to update that
information.
Public school records are protected from dissemination to third
parties under the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 19 74 .16
Again, this Act does not address error correction or disposal of old
data.
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978165 requires banks to
make disclosures to a party, whose account is debited, as to the nature
of the debit.166 This statute is so narrow in scope that its impact is
154. 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
155. Id. § 552a(b)(l)-(12) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
156. Id. § 552a(b) (1988).
157. Id. §§ 552a(d)(1), (d)(2)(B)(i).
158. Id. §§ 552a(e)(9), (e)(4)(E), (e)(5).
159. Id. § 552a(b).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-67(e).
161. Id. § 1666.
162. Id. §§ 1691-1691(e) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
163. Id. § 1691(d).
164. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (1988).
165. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-93r.
166. Id. § 1693d.
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almost negligible. For instance, it does not address dissemination of
general account history. Along similar lines, the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978167 requires financial institutions to notify their
customers before information is provided to government agencies. 168
The statute is silent on the distribution of the customer's name to
telemarketing and other intrusive agencies.
The Privacy Act of 1980169 prohibits government agents from
seizing the work product of the media. This law was passed in direct
response to the raid in question in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.170 The
statute reemphasizes the conflict between governmental pursuit and
the media's right to know. Zurcher reduced individuals' rights in that
the government is not allowed to seize materials to prosecute criminal
libel cases; this leaves the individual only with civil remedies.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 171 crimi-
nally prohibits wiretapping. However, the Act permits phone compa-
nies to capture necessary billing data, such as the recipient's phone
number; the Act also does not regulate use and dissemination of that
billing data.172 The Act does not specifically address the issue of data
protection for cases in which modems communicate confidential data;
however, it appears that wiretapping to intercept any type of commu-
nication is prohibited.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984173 requires that
cable operators notify customers if personally identifiable data about
these consumers are to be collected.' 74 The individual also has the
right to know the purpose of the data collection and the duration of
data storage. 175 Written or electronic consent must precede disclosure
of subscriber specific information to third parties.' 7 6 However, ser-
vice agreements that condition the providing of service on such con-
sent can easily circumvent this statute's provision.
167. 12 US.C. §§ 3401-22.
168. Ild § 3402 (except if the request is a subpoena or search warrant).
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000aa.
170. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (concerning the search of a univer-
sity's student newspaper office for photographs). See also Charles Currier, We Have a Warrant
to Search Your Files, 19 TENN. B.L 12 (1983) (providing an excellent analysis of this law).
171. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21.
172. Reidenberg, supra note 151, at 215.
173. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (1988).
174. Id. § 551.
175. Id § 551(a)(1)(A) and § (C).
176. Id. § 551(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993). Except in a limited number of cases specifically
listed. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2) (1988).
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The Video Privacy Protection Act of 198817 provides for civil
action against video renters for dissemination of a customer's renting
history. 7 8 In this most recent statement on data protection, Congress
did address all processing activities; however, that Act is limited only
to the home entertainment sector.179
C. Common Law
Unless a specific aspect of privacy legislation is addressed by one
of the above federal acts, an individual must rely on tort law. First, an
"intrusion upon the individual's physical solitude or seclusion" may
involve data disseminated without the data subject's consent to a third
party.180 Second, such disclosure also involves the tortious public dis-
closure of private facts.' Both torts have been recognized by various
courts. 1
8 2
It is also possible that a person's personal data are considered
property. While property is defined as an interest recognized by the
law, that recognition has not yet taken place for personal data.' 83 Un-
til the law recognizes such a right, one must argue that personal data
fall under the type of intellectual property now protected at the federal
level. To date, the federal government will not grant a corporation a
copyright on the white telephone pages, even if that company went
through sufficient efforts in making the telephone white telephone
pages useful. 184 It appears that Congress is far away from recognizing
a property interest in an individual's personal data.
Last, an individual may contract with a processor of data to not
publish the individual's information;18 5 if the data processor dissemi-
nates such data, he is in violation of his contract and must pay dam-
ages to the individual. However, contract law does not allow punitive
damages; this results in the benefits of noncompliance far too often
outweighing the cost of breach. The result is a contract breach in
which the individual is paid for the value of nondissemination while
177. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-11.
178. Id. § 2710(C).
179. Reidenberg, supra note 151, at 220.
180. See Joshua D. Blackman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation Protecting Information
Across the Private Sector, 9 SANTA CLARA CoMpurR & HIoH TECH. L.J. 431, 446 (1993)
(citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 4 HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804, 807 (4th ed. 1971)).
181. Blackman, supra note 180, at 446-47.
182. Id. at 446-47.
183. Id. at 450.
184. Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 362-64
(1991).
185. See Blackman, supra note 180, at 450-52.
.[Vol. 12
DATA PROTECTION
the individual's personal information has become known to
millions.'8 6
V. FILLING THE VoID OF DATA PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FOLLOWING THE EUROPEAN EXAMPLE
Based on the above, it is clear that U.S. laws do not adequately
protect an individual in the area of data privacy. This is because Con-
gress has never consistently treated privacy concerns. The narrow and
haphazard assortment of privacy rights through legislation and com-
mon law doctrines neither respond coherently nor consistently to data
protection concerns."i 7 The operative term here is prescribe. Con-
gress has never prescribed.
This leaves U.S. corporations subject to market disadvantages.
The European Commission requires that if data are to be moved
outside the Union, the controller must be satisfied that the receiving
country has adequate safeguards in place; traditionally this adequacy
has been defined as "equivalency." However, equivalency simply
does not exist. The United States does not have the equivalent to the
supervisory board as required by the Amended Proposal. 8 8 The
United States also does not "provide the collection-to-erasure style
protection" of the Amended Proposal.8 9 As a result, the controller is
not likely to permit data to be moved to the United States. This could
force U.S. companies to keep two separate data bases, significantly
reducing the achieved economies of scale. 190
The present approach to data protection in the United States must
change. Broad Congressional legislation protecting informational pri-
vacy is needed both to protect individuals and to serve commercial
interests. 9 ' At the same time, however, a workable balance must be
struck between the needs of the individual and the needs of the
enterprise. 192
One commentator proposed a piece of legislation that addresses
the private sector's use of personal data.'93 The commentator's "Pri-
186. But cf. Amelia H. Boss, Current Issue in Electronic Data Interchange: Electronic Data
Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting Toward a Global Environment, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 31 (1992) (providing arguments against the proposition stated herein).
187. Reidenberg, supra note 151, at 243.
188. Boehmer and Palmer, supra note 138, at 307.
189. Id.
190. See John Markoff, Europe's Plans to Protect Privacy Wony Business, N. Y. TIMES,
April 11, 1991, at Al, D6.
191. Blackman, supra note 180, at 454-64.
192. Reidenberg, supra note 151, at 239.
193. Blackman, supra note 180, at 465-68.
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vate Sector Privacy Act" follows some of the principles set out by the
Amended Proposal. It calls for a data protection board which, similar
to the supervisory board, oversees proper application of the rights to
privacy. 194 In addition, the proposed statute prohibits the collection
and disclosure of an individual's data without consent and places the
burden of correcting data on the controller.1 95 It also provides a bill of
rights of data subjects similar to those articulated in the Amended Pro-
posal.196 However, the proposed statute would also apply to illegal
aliens, a group of people he excludes from the proposed statute's pro-
tected class.197 While this statute presents a good start, it also does
not apply to governmental uses of data.
This author has the following recommendations to drafters of pri-
vacy legislation. First, a statute should cover all types of personal
data, gathered manually or electronically by governmental agencies,
businesses, and nonprofit entities.
Second, the controller of the data must ascertain that the individ-
ual's privacy is adequately protected; such a provision would keep the
types of data collected to the absolute minimum necessary for accom-
plishing the purpose for which the data were gathered. The controller
must ascertain that any personal data are securely stored and, using the
highest standard of care, that information is not accessed without au-
thorization. This places the burden on the controller to ascertain that
unwanted hackers cannot gain access to the computer system, poten-
tially invading the data subject's privacy.
Third, a governmental body through the exercise of the com-
merce power, essentially a "data police," should be charged with na-
tionwide implementation and enforcement of the statute's
provisions. 98 This prevents larger corporations from shopping for
states with the least rigorous rules from which to gather and in which
to process personal data.
Fourth, the statute should establish strict data quality standards.
Data should not be gathered unless the individual is notified of all
purposes for which the data are collected and unless the individual has
given consent to such gathering and processing. Critical data, such as
medical data, sexual preferences, race, religious, political, and philo-
sophical views, should be destroyed unless the data subject has given
written consent for each three month period in which the data are to be
194. Id. at 466.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 467-68.
197. Id. at 466.
198. George Trubow, Protecting Informational Privacy in the Information Society, 10 N.
ILL L. Rw.,. 521, 530 (1990).
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used. In addition, insurance companies, financial institutions, and
other service providers should under no circumstances be allowed to
make an individual's receipt of service dependent on the individual's
consent.
Fifth, personal data should not be distributed to any third parties
unless the data subject has given written consent. Exceptions, to be
used rarely and judiciously, should be made for pressing national se-
curity interests.
Sixth, this author proposes a data subject's bill of rights similar to
that introduced in the Amended Proposal's Bill of Rights, including
the right to know what data are captured for which purpose, the right
to consent and withdraw consent and the right to rectify or erase false
information.
Seventh, transborder data flows should be prohibited unless the
recipient country legislatively protects such personal data adequately.
Such a provision would prevent circumvention of the proposed statute
by way of establishing a subsidiary in a "data controller-friendly coun-
try" for the sole purpose of storing and disseminating data which
would otherwise be prohibited under such statute.
Eighth, the data subject should be granted a private right of ac-
tion for violations of the provisions of this statute. The statute should
set the standard of highest care on the controller of data, holding him
strictly liable for violations of the statute. Such a high burden is justi-
fied since the controller of data is in the only position to fairly process
personal information. Criminal penalties on the corporation and its
management board should be provided for knowing violations of the
statute's provisions.
The above proposals restrict of a business's ability to use per-
sonal data. Such a statute would tremendously increase the cost of
keeping personal information. However, if spread over 250 million
inhabitants, the incremental costs of products and services is likely to
be negligible compared to the exposure to which an individual is sub-
jected under the present system of noninterference when making a
simple telephone call to place a request on one of America Online's
bulletin boards. The range of the burden presently on the individual is
as high as the potential for abuse and blackmail and as low as receiv-
ing solicitation telephone calls.
VI. OBSERVATIONS AMD CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that at present the law in the United States does not
recognize individual's personal data as an interest that needs to be
protected. This is an interesting phenomenon since the founders of the
1996]
96 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURAL
United States emigrated from governmental systems that did not rec-
ognize their rights - the right to free exercise of religion, the right to
free speech, and the right to be left alone. While American lawmakers
have done an excellent job protecting the first two of these rights, they
have neglected the third. The increase in cost of doing business is one
obvious reason for this neglect. Cynics would point out that Washing-
ton serves its industrial constituents by purposely looking the other
way. While some of that cynicism may be justified, one must point
out, in all fairness, that Congress has had numerous occasions on
which to contemplate legislation that would substantially advance an
individual's right to have data pertaining to him remain his own. 199
The Europeans, on the other hand, have advanced laws protecting
personal data since the 1970s. The Amended Proposal together with
the Network Directive possibly represent the state of the art in privacy
protection. Future plans to incorporate privacy in the information so-
ciety are already underway.2 °0 Congressional action incorporating
some of these provisions in a comprehensive data privacy statute
would better assure the protection of U.S. residents' rights to privacy.
If Europe is willing to enforce the Amended Proposal's trans-
border data flows provisions, it may indirectly effect a change in U.S.
law as well. Such a change will occur as soon as American multina-
tional corporations are prevented from exporting European data to the
United States because of inadequate U.S. regulation, thereby increas-
ing the costs and reducing the profits of those corporations.
Nothing will force Congress to act quickly as will the plea of the
corporate constituency. Consequently, a changed approach to data
protection appears inevitable in the United States; only time will tell
how quickly such a change will occur. The sooner such change oc-
curs, the better.
199. See, e.g., Telemarketing/Privacy Issues: Hearing on H.R. 1304 and H.R. 1305 Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (April 24, 1991). See also American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
search, Privacy Protection Proposals, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
200. See BANGEMANN CoMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL: EU-
ROPE AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SocImy (1994).
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